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John D.R. Craig* Guilty Plea Revocation,
Constitutional Waiver, and the
Charter "A Guilty Plea Is Not A
Trap".. *
The entry of a guilty plea has significant constitutional ramifications. It relieves the
Crown of its obligation to prove the elements of an offence beyond a reasonable
doubt and constitutes a waiver by the accused of various rights including the right
to put the Crown's case to the test of a trial, the right to confront Crown witnesses
through cross-examination and the right to remain silent in relation to the
determination of legal guilt. In light of these constitutional dimensions, the article
considers an issue which has received little academic attention: the revocation of
a guiltyplea. The authorassesses the existing Canadian common law revocation
rule, which he finds to be incompatible with the values expressed in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms owing to its narrow scope, uncertainty, and
discretionary nature. He also considers the rule developed within the American
federal court system as a possible alternative to the Canadian approach. The
author proposes a revised revocation rule which provides for the withdrawal of a
guilty plea where the accused can prove on a balance of probabilities that the
guilty plea was either uninformed or involuntary, and which further allows for
revocation at any time priorto sentencing unless the Crown can demonstrate that
significant prejudice would result from revocation. The author counters the view
that the decision to deny the revocation of a guilty plea should be subject to
deference on appeal.
Un plaidoyer de culpabilite a des ramifications constitutionnelles consid6rables
parce qu'il d6charge la Couronne de son obligation de prouver les 6l6ments d'un
d6lit au-dela de tout doute raisonnable et constitue une renonciation de la part de
I'accus6. plusieurs de ses droits constitutionnels, dont le droit a un proces, le
droit de contre-interroger les t6moins de la Couronne, et le droit au silence par
rapport a I'dtablissement de la culpabilite judiciaire. En tenant compte de la
dimension constitutionnelle inh6rente au plaidoyer de culpabilit6, cet article traite
d'un sujet qui a requ jusqu'i date tr~s peu d'attention dans le milieu acad6mique:
le retrait d'un plaidoyer de culpabilit6. L'auteur se livre a une 6valuation de (a regle
canadienne actuelle de la common law sur le retrait d'un plaidoyer de culpabilite
qu'il estime 6tre incompatible avec les valeurs exprimes dans /a Charte canadienne
des droits et libert6s a cause de sa port6e trop 6troite, son impr6cision et sa
discretion inn6e. L'auteur envisage 6galement la regle d6veloppee par les cours
* Doctoral candidate in law, Lincoln College, University of Oxford. I owe a debt of gratitude
to Loretta Colton, Chris Mammen, and Hazel Oliver, each of whom read the manuscript of this
article, and provided invaluable insights and contributions. Thanks also to my Oxford
colleague Philip Marsden.
** Quotation from Dukes v. Warden, Connecticut State Prison, 406 U.S. 250 (1972) at 266,
per Marshall J [hereinafter Dukes]. Dukes is discussed infra notes 90-101 and accompanying
text.
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f6derales am~ricaines en tant qu'alternative possible a I'approche canadienne
actuelle. L'auteur propose une nouvelle r~gle qui autoriserait le retrait d'un
plaidoyer de culpabilit6 dans les cas o& I'accus6 est en mesure d'6tablir, selon
une balance de probabilit6 que sa decision de plaider coupable a 6t6 prise
involontairement ou n'a pas 6t6 prise d'une fagon 6clair~e. Un tel retrait serait
possible a tout moment avant la condamnation a moins que la Couronne
d~montre qu'un pr6judice important en r6sulterait. L'auteur rejette l'opinion que
la d6cision de refuser le retrait d'un plaidoyer de culpabilit6 en premiere instance
fasse l'objet de d6f6rence judiciaire en appel.
Introduction
The presumption of innocence, which is perhaps the most fundamental of
legal rights, places the burden on the Crown to prove all elements of a
criminal offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, s. 11 (d) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' guarantees to an accused
"the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law
in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." The
corollary of the presumption of innocence is the accused's right to remain
silent at both the pre-trial and trial stages of a criminal prosecution. This
right has been recognized as a principle of fundamental justice under s.
7 of the Charter,2 and one aspect of it, the right of non-compellability at
trial, has been specifically protected by s. 11 (c). Taken together, the
presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent form the founda-
tion of a criminal justice system in which, by constitutional dictate, the
Crown is obliged to construct a convincing case against the accused,
while the accused is under no obligation to assist the Crown. The accused
is then entitled to sit back, secure in his or her silence, and put the Crown
to its proof.
A plea of guilty is a formal acknowledgement by the accused of the
validity of the charges faced, and constitutes an admission of the facts
necessary to support a conviction.3 A guilty plea also has considerable
constitutional significance, since it relieves the prosecution of the obliga-
tion underlying s. 11 (d) of the Charter to prove the elements of the
offence beyond a reasonable doubt. In effect, by pleading guilty, an
accused is waiving the right to put the Crown's case to the test of a trial,
1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2. R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 at 162-63, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) I [hereinafter Hebert cited
to S.C.R.]; R. v. Chambers, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1293 at 1316, 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 299.
3. A.W. Mewett, An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1996) at 107.
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and the right to remain silent in relation to the determination of guilt.4 For
this reason, a guilty plea has been described, in the constitutional context,
as "perhaps the most devastating waiver possible."5 Despite the repercus-
sions to the accused of a guilty plea, the great majority of convictions in
the Canadian criminal justice system arise from guilty pleas.6 It is
reasonable to infer that the system would become hopelessly overbur-
dened if every accused pleaded not guilty and demanded a trial. Clearly,
the constitutional waiver of legal rights through guilty pleas has social
utility, if for no other reason than because such pleas reduce the costs of
the justice system and minimize trial delays.
7
This article considers an important issue of pleading which, to date, has
received little academic consideration in Canada: the revocation of a
guilty plea. As will be demonstrated below, a Canadian common law rule
was developed prior to the entrenchment of the Charter which, though
allowing the revocation of a guilty plea, places the matter squarely within
the discretion of the trial judge (or, more accurately, thejudge hearing the
motion to withdraw a guilty plea). Keeping in mind that "the Charter has
fundamentally changed our legal landscape", and that "[a] legal rule
relevant to a fundamental right may be too narrow to be reconciled with
the philosophy and approach of the Charter",8 this article will analyze the
common law guilty plea revocation rule in light of modem Charter
values. The analysis will also draw on guilty plea revocation jurispru-
dence from the United States. The American federal experience not only
demonstrates some of the inadequacies of the extant Canadian common
law position, but also has its own deficiencies which Canadian law should
strive to avoid. In conclusion, the article advances several proposals for
the reformulation of rules for guilty plea revocation.
4. Korponay v. Canada (A.G.), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 41 at 49, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 354 [hereinafter
Korponay cited to S.C.R.]. Note that an accused is also waiving certain rights inherent to the
s. 11 (d) concept of a "fair trial", including the general right to make full answer and defence,
and the right to confront Crown witnesses through cross-examination, R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4
S.C.R. 595 at 692, 109 D.L.R. (4th) 478.
5. Dukes, supra note **. See also R. v. Adgey, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 426 at 440, 39 D.L.R. (3d) 553
(per Laskin J., dissenting) [hereinafter Adgey cited to S.C.R.].
6. "It is well to recall in any discussion of sentencing procedures that the vast majority of
offenders plead guilty. Canadian figures are not readily available but American statistics
suggest about 85 percent of the criminal defendants plead guilty or nolo contendere....
Sentencing is, in respect of most offenders, the only significant decision the criminal justice
system is called upon to make." R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368 at 414, 140 D.L.R. (3d)
612.
7. J. Watson, "Guilty Pleas" (1990) 33 Crim. L.Q. 163 at 198-99.
8. Hebert, supra note 2 at 164, per McLachlin J.
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I. Pleading and the Rationale Underlying Reocation
The severe consequences of a guilty plea are at the root of the rule that
such a plea is valid only if it is informed and is entered freely and
unequivocally. In some cases, the deficiencies of a guilty plea will be
obvious. For example, a plea of "guilty ... at least that's what my lawyer
told me to say" or "guilty ... I guess"9 are clearly unacceptable because
they lack the requisite degree of certainty and voluntariness required by
the law. 0 In other cases, uncertainty, involuntariness, or lack of informa-
tion may underlie an explicit plea of guilt. Although Canadian judges are
under no compulsory duty to inquire into the validity of a guilty plea
according to the "voluntary", "unequivocal", and "informed" criteria (as
are their American counterparts"), they are well-advised, particularly
where an accused is unrepresented by counsel, to engage in a searching
inquiry to ensure that an accused understands the charges and the
ramifications of a guilty plea, and intends freely to enter the plea. 2 One
could conclude that where such an inquiry has occurred and an accused
nevertheless maintains the guilty plea, then the plea should be binding.
However, the reality of the pleading process demonstrates why guilty
pleas should be approached with caution.
It is a well-known fact that individuals who intentionally commit
criminal acts (i.e. the "morally guilty") often plead not guilty. This is their
9. In the case of R. v. Lamothe (1908), 15 C.C.C. 61 at 66-7 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Lamothe],
the accused was charged with being a "frequenter of a house of ill-fame". He was the landlord
of the house in question, and claimed that he was merely on the premises to collect rent. When
asked to plead, he responded sarcastically, "I am guilty, if you call going to collect rent guilty."
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erred in accepting such a plea.
10. Mewett, supra note 3 at 108; R. v. R.T. (1992), 58 O.A.C. 81 at 89, 10 O.R. (3d) 514.
11. United States, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1975), r. 11, requires trial judges to
address the defendant "personally", and to ascertain that a plea of guilty has been made
"voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."
See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text, and P.E. Gartner, Jr., "Withdrawal of Guilty
Pleas in the Federal Courts Prior to Sentencing" (1975) 27 Baylor L. Rev. 793 at 795.
12. R. v. Brosseau, [1969] S.C.R. 181 at 190, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 139 [hereinafter Brosseau cited
to S.C.R.], per Cartwright C.J.: "it cannot be said that where ... an accused is represented by
counsel and tenders a plea of guilty to non-capital murder, the trial Judge before accepting it
is bound, as a matter of law, to interrogate the accused." Compare to Spence J., dissenting, at
190: "I am of the opinion that it is the duty of the trial tribunal ... to satisfy himself that the
appellant understands the nature of the charge and the effect of the plea before he is entitled to
accept a plea of guilty." Moreover, in Adgey, supra note 5 at 442-43, Laskin J. (dissenting)
found certain aspects of the Brosseau decision to be unacceptable, with the implication that he
preferred the approach of Spence J. The Supreme Court of Canada has not revisited this issue
in the Charter era, but the Brosseau majority has been followed by provincial appellate courts.
See R. v. Newman (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 481 at 488,79 C.C.C. (3d) 394 (C.A.); R. v. Clermont
(1996), 150 N.S.R. (2d) 264 at 270,436 A.P.R. 264 (C.A.).
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right, of course, as our Constitution presumes their innocence, the burden
of proof rests with the Crown to prove otherwise, and there is no legal
requirement that they should facilitate or expedite their prosecution. A
distinction between "moral guilt" and "legal guilt" is simple to state:
those who are morally guilty have committed a crime (and only they
know for certain of their moral guilt), whereas those who are legally
guilty have been proven to be guilty by the Crown in a criminal trial.
Hence, while one may be morally guilty of an offence, one becomes
legally guilty only when one is successfully prosecuted for the offence.
While our criminal justice system seeks to deter every potential criminal,
the morally and legally guilty alike, it only punishes the legally guilty.
This is an inevitable result of the fact that even the morally guilty are
presumed innocent unless and until a guilty verdict is reached, and
sentence may be imposed only upon those found guilty by a court of law.
Once one appreciates the moral guilt/legal guilt distinction, one can
see how a guilty plea effectively converts moral guilt into legal guilt. At
the time of pleading, the Crown has yet to present its case. A plea of not
guilty triggers the trial process, where the Crown may or may not prove
its case. If the Crown's evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, a morally guilty accused becomes legally guilty. 3 A plea of guilty
relieves the Crown of its burden. The trial is unnecessary and legal guilt
results out of the actions of the accused. It is thus hardly surprising that
an accused might have second thoughts subsequent to the making of the
guilty plea. An accused might reassess the advice received from his or her
lawyer, family, or friends to plead guilty, and decide that the advice was
flawed; subsequent events might bolster the accused's confidence of
prevailing in a trial; or the accused might simply regret being the author
of his or her own doom. In all these cases, such an accused might wish to
be returned to his or her pre-pleading status, in order to exercise the right
to test the Crown's case in a trial.
One could, in denying revocation, take some solace in binding accused
persons to guilty pleas where they are morally guilty anyway. However,
this is simplistic reasoning because the morally guilty may prove to be
either legally guilty or legally not guilty, 4 depending on the strength of
13. Leaving aside those cases where innocent (i.e. morally blameless) persons are found
guilty.
14. I use the term "legally not guilty" to include the "morally blameless", who did nothing
wrong (and therefore should not be found legally guilty in a criminal trial), and those who,
despite their moral guilt, would nevertheless be able to secure an acquittal at trial. The latter
group would include those who are able to benefit from a reasonable doubt at trial, and those
who achieve a "jury nullification" (i.e. ajury acquittal on sympathetic grounds, or for another
reason unrelated to whether or not they committed the crime in question).
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the Crown's case against them. It is their legal status which matters under
our criminal justice system. Moreover, just as the morally guilty may
plead not guilty, it is conceivable that the morally blameless15 may plead
guilty. 16 Consider the systemic pressures within the criminal justice
system which promote guilty pleas. First, given the difficulties of
predicting the outcome of a criminal trial, an accused may prefer to enter
into a plea bargain with the Crown rather than risk a guilty verdict. 7 As
a quid pro quo for relieving it of having to proceed to trial,"8 the Crown
will generally be willing to offer some benefit to an accused, for example,
by allowing him or her to plead guilty to a lesser offence, or by
recommending a lighter sentence to the trial judge, or both. Such
considerations may not be available if the accused insists on a trial. Thus,
a plea of not guilty presents an accused with a risk-laden situation, while
a guilty plea may at least allow the accused to minimize the sentence.19
Secondly, there have been recent suggestions that the police, the prosecu-
tion, and defence lawyers operate under assumptions of guilt and actively
promote pleas of guilt.2° The police "charge up" to the highest category
of offence and include the greatest number of counts possible, "in order
15. My use of the term "morally blameless" is explained ibid.
16. A recent British Royal Commission study indicates that criminal defence banisters are
concerned that "innocent" accuseds may be pleading guilty. Over the course of a two-week
study period, fifty-three defence barristers stated that they had clients who pleaded guilty
despite being innocent: U.K., Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, The Crown Court Study
(Research Study No. 19) by M. Zander & P. Henderson (London: H.M.S.O., 1993); M. Zander,
"Tom Sergeant Memorial Lecture: The Royal Commission's Crown Court Survey" (11
December 1992) New L.J. 1730; M. Zander, "Royal Commission's Crown Court Study: The
'Innocent' (?) Who Plead Guilty" (January 22, 1993) New L.J. 85.
17. A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983) at
312: "The injustice [of plea bargaining] arises when the pressure is so great ... as to induce a
defendant to change his plea even though he believes that he is innocent, or that he has an
arguable point of law or question of degree."
18. From the Crown's perspective, it makes sense to accord some concession to an accused
who pleads guilty because, among other reasons, costs and delays are reduced or because
witnesses (including complainants) are saved from the trauma of having to testify.
19. In North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S.Ct. 160 at 167 (1970), the United States Supreme Court
(per White J.) accepted that accuseds "may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if [they are] unwilling or unable to admit...
participation in the acts constituting the crime." An accused may have "nothing to gain by a
trial and much to gain by pleading [guilty]." See also, Note, "Plea Bargaining and the
Transformation of the Criminal Process" (1977) 90 Harvard L. Rev. 564 at 573 [hereinafter
"Plea Bargaining"]: "The practice of exchanging sentencing concessions for guilty pleas
creates an incentive for defendants to plead guilty whenever there is a significant risk of
conviction at trial", and at 574: "While plea bargaining thus reduces the inaccuracies and costs
of the traditional model, it also presents a danger that innocent defendants will be tempted to
plead guilty."
20. R.V. Ericson, "The Decline of Innocence" (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 367 at 368.
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to create a position in which charge reductions and charge withdrawals
can be offered in exchange for guilty pleas."' 2' Defence and prosecution
lawyers are usually under tremendous work pressures, and may prefer to
negotiate a plea bargain than engage in a lengthy or complex trial.
22
Prosecutors may be tempted to press for a plea bargain in order to secure
a conviction in cases where, for technical, constitutional or other reasons,
they doubt their ability to prove legal guilt.23 These factors conspire to
create a climate in which pressure may be exerted on an accused to plead
guilty. Third, criminal trials can be lengthy and expensive affairs in which
an accused can be subject to intense public scrutiny. An accused might
choose to avoid all of this by entering a plea of guilty ab initio, and thereby
escaping the ordeal of a trial.
24
Imagine a situation in which an accused, inexperienced with the
criminal justice system and having been charged with the most serious
crime possible in the circumstances, is faced with the prospects of a costly
trial, adverse publicity and a lengthy prison sentence if convicted. It is
hardly surprising that even a morally blameless accused might choose to
accept a plea bargain, particularly where defence counsel (for whatever
reason) is urging the merits of a guilty plea, such as a lighter sentence. In
short, facts irrelevant to guilt (either in the moral or legal sense) may
influence an accused to plead guilty despite being legally not guilty of the
crime to which the plea is directed.
While such considerations could justify a liberal approach to guilty
plea revocation prior to sentencing, and perhaps a similarly generous
approach even after sentencing, the common law in both Canada and the
United States appears to have adopted a more restrictive position. Indeed,
while the law in both countries is supposedly generous in relation to pre-
sentencing guilty plea revocation, the application of that law lies within
the discretion of the judge hearing the revocation application. Judges
have demonstrated considerable reluctance to grant guilty plea revoca-
tion motions, and appellate courts have resisted interfering with the
exercise of judicial discretion. As will be argued below, the extant
Canadian legal position on the issue of guilty plea revocation cannot be
reconciled with the values enshrined in the Charter, which favour a
21. Ibid. at 369-70.
22. Ibid. at 370.
23. "Plea Bargaining", supra note 19 at 573.
24. In R. v. Leo (1993), 144 A.R. 98 at 101 (Prov. Ct.), aff'd (1994), 157 A.R. 264 (C.A.),
leave to appeal ref'd [1994] 3 S.C.R. viii [hereinafter Leo], the accused claimed that fear of
adverse publicity contributed to his guilty plea. This case is discussed infra, notes 62-74 and
accompanying text.
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cautious approach to guilty pleas, a generous approach to revocation, and
a more rigorous standard of appellate review. First, however, it is
necessary to consider the law as it has developed in both Canada and the
United States.
II. The Canadian Common Law Rule Governing
Guilty Plea Revocation
The origins of the Canadian common law rule governing guilty plea
revocation lie in the early English law on the issue. Two English cases are
of particular note. In R. v. Sell,25 the accused was charged with theft,
entered a plea of guilty, and was sentenced. He then moved to withdraw
his plea. The Court concluded, after considerable consultation, that the
motion could not be granted since a sentence had already been pro-
nounced. However, the Court noted that if sentencing had not yet
occurred, the accused would have been allowed to retract his plea because
"there is never any difficulty" in granting such a motion prior to
sentencing.2 6 This liberal approach to pre-sentencing revocation was
followed in the next reported case on the issue, R. v. Clouter.27 There, the
accused Clouter pleaded guilty to charges of uttering a forged document.
He later sought withdrawal of the plea on the basis that he had misunder-
stood the nature of the charge and had not known that the document in
question was forged. Bramwell J. allowed the withdrawal because the
accused had sworn that the plea was entered by mistake." A King's
Bench decision of 1902, R. v. Plummer, thus summed-up the English
position as it stood at the turn of the century: a court has the power to allow
withdrawal of a guilty plea "at any time before, though not after,
judgment.
29
The early English cases leave one with the impression that guilty plea
withdrawal, where requested prior to sentencing, was permitted rou-
tinely. This same impression arises from the early Canadian case law.3°
In R. v. Guay, the Court cited the English case law, and then observed:
"[i]n the District of Montreal, it is customary to allow the accused to
change a plea of guilty to a plea of not guilty at any time before he is
sentenced."'" However, the same Court then held that the decision
25. (1840), 9 Car. & P. 347, 173 E.R. 863.
26. Ibid. at 863 (E.R.).
27. (1859), 8 Cox Crim. L.C. 237.
28. Ibid. at 237.
29. [1902] 2 K.B. 339 at 347.
30. See, in particular, Lamothe, supra note 9 at 66-7.
31. (1914), 23 C.C.C. 243 at 245 (Que. S.C.).
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whether or not to allow guilty plea revocation rested exclusively within
the discretion of the trial judge. The Court went so far as to state that, "the
exercise of such discretion cannot be reviewed on a case reserved."32 This
position was then adopted, with striking results, in R. v. Nelson,33 where
the accused sought to change his guilty plea on the basis that he was being
framed by two other prisoners, and pleaded guilty because he thought his
conviction was inevitable. The trial judge denied revocation. On appeal,
Walsh J.A. held that the decision to deny revocation was within the
discretion of the trial judge, and "[a]s long as he exercised a sound legal
discretion, I do not think that I can, or that I should, interfere with his
exercise of it. ' 34 Walsh J.A. then added a comment which demonstrates
the tension between a liberal revocation rule, and the placing of decisions
made according to that rule within the discretion of trialjudges. He wrote:
I feel quite at liberty to say that if I had been in the magistrate's place I
would have allowed this plea to be changed even if I had had no doubt of
the guilt of the accused. I think that [this] is what I would do in any case
in which the application was made in proper time and no prejudice had
resulted to the Crown from the original plea, such, for instance, as the
dispersal of its witnesses, no matter how satisfied I might be of the guilt of
the accused .... To say that because I would have done otherwise therefore
the magistrate did wrong, would be to substitute my discretion for his, and
that I cannot do.35
By taking this position, Walsh J.A. was effectively endorsing the appli-
cation by trial judges of potentially divergent approaches to guilty plea
revocation. Hence, an accused in exactly the same position as Nelson
would have been allowed to revoke his plea if the trial judge had shared
Walsh J.A.'s view, as opposed to that of Nelson's trial judge.
The position asserted by Walsh J.A. in Nelson remains consistent with
the law in Canada even today: guilty plea revocation is permissible, but
is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.36 There is still little
guidance as to the factors which should inform the exercise of this
discretion. The Supreme Court of Canada has had three occasions in the
past forty years to consider guilty plea revocation, but has failed in each
case to articulate a clear rule or set of factors governing such revocation.
Thus, in R. v. Thibodeau,37 the Court confirmed that, "the decision
32. Ibid. at 245-46.
33. (1919), 32 C.C.C. 75, [1920] 1 W.W.R. 150 (Alta. S.C.).
34. Ibid. at 77.
35. Ibid. at 77-8.
36. This is also the common law position in both England and Australia. See S. (an infant)
v. Manchester City Recorder and Others, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1230 (H.L.); Shimon Amuzig Sagiv
(1986), 22 A. Crim. R. 73 (N.S.W.C.A.).
37. [1955] S.C.R. 646, 21 C.R. 265 [hereinafter Thibodeau cited to S.C.R.].
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whether or not permission to withdraw a plea of guilty should be given
rests in the discretion of the Judge to whom the application for such
permission is made and that this discretion, if exercised judicially, will
not be lightly interfered with",3" and further held that a revoked guilty
plea could not be used as evidence against the accused at trial.39 Five
years later, in R. v. Bamsey,40 the Court (per Ritchie J.) relied on
Thibodeau in concluding that it was only permissible for an accused to
change his guilty plea, "if he can satisfy [the Court] that there are valid
grounds for his being permitted to do so."
'4'
Finally, inAdgey,42 the appellant had pleaded guilty to charges of false
pretences, fraud, and break, enter and theft. After his pleas were entered,
he offered an explanation which gave rise to the possibility that he could
have mounted a defence to at least the break, enter and theft charge. The
question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the trial judge
erred in accepting the guilty plea. For the majority, Dickson J. (as he then
was) noted that because the appellant had been represented by counsel,
there was no obligation on the trial judge to inquire into the guilty pleas
prior to accepting them (i.e. the Brosseau rule).43 Where, however, a trial
judge makes such an inquiry, then, "the judge may, in his discretion,
direct that a plea of not guilty be entered or permit the accused to withdraw
his original plea or enter a new one." 4 Dickson J. then repeated the test
from Bamsey, observing that a guilty plea may be changed if the accused
has raised a "valid ground" for doing so. He resisted the opportunity to
elaborate upon the revocation rule, stating that, "[i]t would be unwise to
attempt to define all that which might be embraced within the phrase
38. Ibid. at 654.
39. Ibid. at 655.
40. [1960] S.C.R. 294, 125 C.C.C. 329 [hereinafter Bamsey cited to S.C.R.]. See also R. v.
Tennen, [1960] S.C.R. 302, 125 C.C.C. 336, which was heard together with Bamsey.
41. Bamsey, ibid. at 298. Note that Bamsey had been convicted at trial on the basis of his own
guilty plea, but had successfully appealed the conviction to the County Court, which then
ordered a new trial at which Bamsey entered a plea of not guilty. Ritchie J., at 301, concluded
that the County Court erred in permitting Bamsey "to plead 'not guilty' without any reason
being given to support his change of plea." By appealing his conviction, as opposed to moving
to revoke his guilty plea, Bamsey was able to change his plea without having to meet the
requirements of the common law revocation rule. This constituted, "playing fast and loose with
the administration of justice", at 300.
42. Supra note 5.
43. Ibid. at 429.
44. Ibid. at 430. Dickson J. added that, "[t]he discretion exercised by the trial judge is one
which 'if exercised judicially, will not be lightly interfered with.' per Cartwright J. (as he then
was) in Thibodeau v. The Queen...."
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'valid grounds'."45 However, his resolution of the case provides some
clues as to the grounds which he had in mind as being "valid". In the case
of the false pretences and fraud charges, Dickson J. found that the accused
provided no explanation which could have afforded a defence at trial.
46
In the case of the break, enter and theft charge, the accused advanced an
explanation consistent with "colour of right". However, in pleading
guilty the accused "admits having done that with which he is charged"
and therefore "admitted he broke and entered" 47 the premises in question.
After examining the available evidence, Dickson J. concluded that, "it is
difficult to discern any foundation upon which a claim to colour of right
could properly rest.
48
In dissent, Laskin J. (as he then was, for himself and Spence J.) found
that there was sufficient doubt in relation to the mens rea element of the
break, enter and theft charge to justify changing the plea from guilty to not
guilty.4 9 Laskin J. did not comment specifically on the revocation rule,
because his judgment was centred on the failure of the trial judge to make
adequate inquiries prior to accepting the accused's plea (a position which
required him to seek the overturning of Brosseau). In fact, he opined that
resort to guilty plea revocation would occur less frequently if trial judges
made appropriate inquiries in advance of pleading.5" He nevertheless
gave some indications that in the absence of inquiry, guilty plea revoca-
tion should be allowed liberally. First, his reasons were based on the
premise that a guilty plea is a serious waiver of legal rights, including the
right of non-compellability, the right to remain silent, and the right to
offer full answer anddefence. 1 For this reason, "[i]t is important.., that
the plea be made voluntarily and upon a full understanding of the nature
of the charge and its consequences and that it be unequivocal."52 Sec-
45. Ibid. at 431. See, however, the list of grounds offered by Cullen D.C.J. in R. v. Barr
(1967), 64 W.W.R. 57 at 58 (Alta. Dist. Ct.), affd 64 W.W.R. 384n (C.A.). See also, Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Double Jeopardy, Pleas, and Verdicts (Working Paper 63)
(Ottawa: The Commission, 1991) Recommendation 24 at 85. The Commission offers four
grounds justifying guilty plea revocation: (a) the accused had no prior notice of the prosecutor's
intention to make a dangerous offender application; (b) the plea was entered as a result of an
improper inducement or without a proper understanding that the accused could choose to plead
not guilty to the charge; (c) the accused did not properly understand the nature of the charge
or the effects of pleading guilty to it; or (d) the accused did not know the mandatory sentence,
if any, for the crime charged.
46. Adgey, supra note 5 at 431-32.
47. Ibid. at 433.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. at 445.
50. Ibid. at 444.
51. Ibid. at 440.
52. Ibid.
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ondly, in what could be seen as a veiled criticism of Dickson J.'s
consideration of the merits of the "colour of right" defence, Laskin J.
stated that the issue is whether the existence of conflicts between the
Crown's allegations and the accused's explanation leads one to doubt
"the propriety of the plea of guilty in terms of the accused's understanding
and appreciation of it and its unequivocal character."53 Presumably,
judges should not hold a trial to determine the merits of an accused's
explanation, in order to decide whether a guilty plea should stand.54
Indeed, the fact that Adgey could have mounted a "colour of right"
defence, but for some reason was unaware of it at the time of pleading,
seems sufficient to justify the revocation of his guilty plea. Dickson J.
would have rejected the plea withdrawal not because Adgey's plea was
informed, voluntary and unequivocal, but instead because, in his view,
the potential defence lacked merit. Dickson J. effectively tried and
convicted Adgey on the break, enter and theft charge in order to reject his
appeal.
In light of the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on the issue of
guilty plea revocation, the following principles can be identified:
1) Revocation of a guilty plea prior to sentencing is permissible (Thibodeau,
Bamsey, Adgey);
2) A revoked guilty plea may not be used as evidence against the accused
in the subsequent trial (Thibodeau);
3) The decision whether or not permission should be given to revoke a
plea of guilty rests within the discretion of the judge to whom the
application for such permission is made, and this discretion, if exer-
cisedjudicially, will notbe lightly interfered with on appeal (Thibodeau,
Bamsey, Adgey);
4) Accuseds have no right to withdraw guilty pleas. An accused must
advance a "valid ground" to justify a guilty plea revocation. A simple
request to revoke a guilty plea and proceed to trial is insufficient to
justify revocation (Bamsey);
5) It would be unwise to list exhaustively the valid grounds which would
justify guilty plea revocation, as this would fetter the discretion of the
judge to whom a revocation application is made (Adgey);
6) Valid grounds for guilty plea revocation include: the accused never
intended to admit to a fact which is an essential ingredient of the
offence or has admitted facts which do not amount to an offence; the
accused misapprehended the effect of the guilty plea; the accused
never intended to plead guilty (Adgey);
53. Ibid. at 444.
54. Ibid.
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7) The existence of a defence on the merits may also be a valid ground for
sentencing. However, the mere assertion by the accused of the exist-
ence of a defence is probably insufficient to warrant revocation
(Adgey).
Although there have been some refinements to the revocation rule
since Nelson, the basic proposition that revocation may be allowed at the
discretion of the trial judge remains the law in Canada. The open-ended
nature of the rule has resulted in inconsistencies and controversy in the
jurisprudence.5 A discussion of two cases with similar facts but different
results will illustrate this point.
It is generally accepted that where an accused has been pressured by
counsel to plead guilty, then this may be a valid ground to justify
withdrawal of the plea if it leads to the conclusion that the plea was not
sufficiently voluntary. In R. v. Lamoureux,56 the accused pleaded guilty
to a charge of theft. Six weeks later, at the commencement of the
sentencing hearing, Lamoureux's counsel moved to vacate the plea.
Counsel told the trial judge that he had pressured Lamoureux to plead
guilty, despite Lamoureux's protestations of innocence, because the
evidence supported a conviction and a guilty plea was likely to lead to a
lighter sentence. The trial judge, in exercising his discretion, nevertheless
concluded that the plea was voluntary, rejected the motion, and sentenced
Lamoureux. In the Court of Appeal, Rothman J.A. found that the trial
judge had erred. Though noting that "this Court should not lightly
interfere with the decision of the trial judge",57 Rothman J.A. was
troubled by the fact that the evidence of both Lamoureux and his counsel
"indicate[d] that the plea of guilty was induced by pressure from counsel
and that the accused did not wish to plead guilty."58 Rothman J.A.
55. The Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 45 at 85, took the view that legal
reform of the revocation rule was required in order "to provide a more structured series of
rules... and thus to promote the uniformity and fairness of this area of the law." R. v. Hansen
(1977), 37 C.C.C. (2d) 371 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter Hansen] demonstrates the need for such
reform. There, the Manitoba Court of Appeal split 3-2 on the issue of whether an accused should
be entitled to revoke a guilty plea where the Crown misled him about the potential for the laying
of a more serious charge in the absence of a guilty plea. The majority, per Matas J.A. at 374-
75, emphasized the unfairness of holding the accused to his plea in such circumstances,
particularly because a guilty ptea has "serious connotations." The dissent, per Guy J.A. at 373,
would have bound the accused to his plea due to the need for "finality in legal proceedings".
As the analysis below will demonstrate, the dissenting position in Hansen is untenable in the
Charter era because an accused's constitutional rights are of greater weight than the value of
"finality". Even prior to the entrenchment of the Charter, the dissenting position could have
been criticized for its harsh results.
56. (1984), 40 C.R. (3d) 369, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 101 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter Lamoureux cited
to C.R.].
57. Ibid. at 373.
58. Ibid.
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emphasized the importance to an accused of effective counsel and the
right to counsel protected by s. 10(b) of the Charter,59 and stated the
following as the controlling proposition:
Now, counsel has, not only a right, but a duty to advise an accused as to the
weaknesses of his case, as to the probable outcome of the trial and as to the
nature and consequences of a plea. Sometimes that advice must be firmly
given. But counsel certainly has no right to pressure an accused into
anything, least of all into pleading guilty. A plea of guilty must always be
a free and voluntary act by the accused himself, untainted by any threats
or promises to induce the accused to admit that he committed the offence
when he does not wish or intend to do so.6°
Rothman J.A. then considered the fact that the evidence available
supported the accused's guilt. However, in contrast to Dickson J.'s
approach in Adgey, this was deemed irrelevant: "the issue, at this stage,
is whether or not he voluntarily offered the plea of guilty. If he did not,
then it cannot stand, however guilty he may ultimately be proved to be at
his trial.
' 61
Lamoureux contrasts sharply with Leo,62 a case in which the pressure
exerted by counsel was at least as egregious as that which occurred in
Lamoureux. There, Leo pleaded guilty to charges of "unlawfully obtain-
ing or attempting to obtain, for consideration, the sexual services of a
person under the age of 18 years old." He then retained new counsel, and
at the start of the sentencing hearing moved to vacate the guilty plea. The
lawyer who had represented Leo at the time of his plea testified at the
motion. His evidence indicated that Leo had been reluctant to plead guilty
from the time of their first meeting, that he had gone over the Crown
allegations with Leo only briefly, and that he had never reviewed the
police report and the Crown's alleged facts and particulars with Leo.'
Nevertheless, he pressed Leo to plead guilty because he "felt very
strongly" that this was advisable.65 Leo finally agreed just prior to
entering the courtroom, and the lawyer then entered the guilty plea on his
behalf. However, after the Crown prosecutor read out the alleged facts
and particulars, Leo refused to admit them because of significant errors.
59. Ibid. at 374.
60. Ibid. at 373.
61. Ibid. at 374-75.
62. Supra note 24 (144 A.R., Prov. Ct.).
63. Ibid. at 100. Leo's counsel testified that, "Leo had somewhat 'sat on the fence' throughout
the time that the file was open as to what he was going to do."
64. Ibid. at 100.
65. Ibid. at 101. It appears that his reasons included concerns about the adverse publicity Leo
would face from a trial.
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A "heated" discussion ensued outside the courtroom, in which the lawyer
advised Leo "in very strong terms" that a failure to maintain his guilty
plea could have serious ramifications, in particular that new allegations
and charges might be made against him.66 The lawyer also advised Leo
that if he planned to plead not guilty, then he should obtain new counsel.
67
Leo testified that he felt under great pressure from the lawyer to plead
guilty both before and during the pleading proceedings, and claimed that
his uncertainty frustrated and angered the lawyer, leading to incidents of
yelling. 68 Because of his lawyer's forcefulness and anger, Leo felt he
"had no choice" and "had reached the point of no return."'69 It was for this
reason that he agreed to stick with his guilty plea. However, within days
of making the plea, he acquired new counsel for the purposes of seeking
revocation.
The testimony at the revocation motion leaves one with the distinct
impression that Leo's lawyer was operating under a "presumption of
guilt" (as discussed in Part II above).7" Leo was inexperienced with the
criminal justice system, which made him particularly susceptible to
pressure from his counsel. In any event, the evidence is clear that he was
very reluctant to plead guilty both at the time of initial pleading, and at the
time when he was called upon to admit the Crown's facts and particu-
lars. 7' Given this, and in light of Lamoureux, one would have thought that
revocation of Leo's guilty plea would have been permitted. However, the
trial judge, Fradsham P.C.J., exercised his discretion to deny the motion,
even relying on Lamoureux to support the proposition that it is appropri-
ate for lawyers to provide firm advice to clients to plead guilty.7 The
learned judge concluded that Leo's lawyer had given "strong" advice, but
had not pressured him, and that the lawyer had represented him compe-
66. Ibid. at 100.
67. Ibid. at 101. Leo's counsel testified that, "I said to him at one point that I thought he should
have a trial and he should have a trial with somebody else as his lawyer."
68. Ibid. at 104.
69. Ibid.
70. The Leo case could well be a "textbook example" of the phenomenon discussed by
Ericson in his article "The Decline of Innocence", supra note 20. According to Leo's testimony
at the revocation motion, his lawyer advised him to plead guilty to take advantage of conditions
which could limit his sentence: "today we got all the favourable elements. We got a very, very
reasonablejudge, we got a soft Crown prosecutor, and we got a good psychiatric report and let's
go for it": Leo, supra note 24 at 103.
71. Leo testified that, upon learning of the Crown's alleged facts and particulars, he told the
lawyer, "there's something very wrong here. I mean, Christ, how can I - I plead to something
I - I may not even have done. Those things are totally untrue": ibid. at 104.
72. Ibid. at 106.
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tently.73 With respect, these findings are difficult to reconcile with the
evidence.
Leo appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, which concluded
that the revocation decision was within the discretion of Fradsham P.C.J.,
and thus refused to overturn his decision.7 4 An application for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was also unsuccessful.
Lamoureux and Leo are substantially similar cases, for the following
reasons: (1) in each case, the accused was reluctant to plead guilty and did
so at the insistence of his lawyer; (2) both accuseds then sought to revoke
the plea at the first possible opportunity, in order to have a trial and put
the Crown to its proof; (3) in each case, the evidence suggested that the
accused would probably be found guilty at trial; and (4) the trial judges
in both cases exercised their discretion to deny revocation, concluding
that the pleas were entered voluntarily. The real difference between the
two cases lies in the approaches of the appellate courts. In Lamoureux, the
Quebec Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erred in exercising
his discretion, because the facts did not support the voluntariness of the
plea; in Leo the Alberta Court of Appeal deferred to the trial judge's
discretionary decision. If one subscribes to the view that the decision
whether or not to permit revocation should not be overturned easily by an
appellate court, then Leo, and not Lamoureux, may have been decided
correctly. If, however, one prefers a more stringent standard of appellate
review, in order to reflect the significance of a guilty plea and the
constitutional rights at stake, then the result in Lamoureux is preferable.
Leaving aside the issue of the standard of appellate review, the two
cases also raise the issue of what the test should be for guilty plea
revocation. In cases where an accused reluctantly pleads guilty (perhaps
because of pressure to do so from counsel), yet acts quickly and with
sincerity to revoke the plea, and there is no evidence that the Crown's case
has been prejudiced by the guilty plea, one must ask what values or
objectives are served by refusing the motion to revoke the guilty plea?
Should the guilty plea be enforced in order to avoid a costly trial (i.e. an
efficiency objective), or to ensure finality to legal proceedings?75 Should
73. Ibid. at 107.
74. The Court of Appeal held as follows:
When the appellant sought to withdraw his plea, he urged Fradsham, P.C.J., to consider
his evidence as well as that of his former Lawyer, Mr. Lord. The Judge did so. After
hearing that evidence, Fradsham, P.C.J., then concluded the appellant's plea of guilty
was not forced by any improper pressure by his conclusion.
In the result, we can find no error by Fradsham P.C.J.
(1994), 157 A.R. 264 at 264-65.
75. Hansen, supra note 55, per Guy J.A.
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it be enforced as a warning to future defendants to take their pleading
more seriously (i.e. a deterrence objective)? Or, should the morally guilty
(as one might conclude of Leo and Lamoureux) be bound to their guilty
pleas regardless of their legal guilt?76 Neither of the trial judges in Leo and
Lamoureux explicitly considered such questions. Moreover, neither of
the judges recognized (or expressed concern about) the fact that a guilty
plea is a significant waiver of constitutional rights, with serious ramifi-
cations for the liberty of an accused. This factor could surely support a
liberal approach to revocation, in order to promote fairness and preserve
the integrity of the Constitution. The trial results in both Leo and
Lamoureux were to deny guilty plea revocation when no criminal justice
value was identified to support the denial, and no consideration was given
to the constitutional values which were threatened by the denial. Surely,
any test for guilty plea revocation should be sensitive to such values.
The American jurisprudence on the issue of guilty plea revocation has
focused to a much greater extent on the values, constitutional and
otherwise, which are at stake. It is therefore helpful to turn now to that
experience.
III. The American Federal Experience with Guilty Plea Revocation
There is a vast amount of state and federal case law in the United States
on the issue of guilty plea revocation, and it is certainly beyond the scope
of this article to canvass it all.77 Thus, federal as opposed to state law will
be considered.
76. One inevitably wonders whether the trial judges in the two cases were motivated
primarily by the apparent factual guilt of the accuseds, as opposed to the validity of their guilty
pleas. See Note, "Presentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in Federal Courts" (1965) 40
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 759 at 759 [hereinafter "Presentence Withdrawal"]: "some courts are undoubt-
edly affected in their exercise of discretion when the defendant seems to have committed the
acts charged."
77. A good overview of state and federal law can be found in D.L. Grundmeyer et al.,
"Withdrawal of Pleas" (1981) 21 Am. Jur. 2d 829 (§§ 500-511). State law evinces a variety of
approaches to the issue of guilty plea revocation: (1) revocation allowed for "good cause":
California Penal Code, § 1018; Florida R. Crim. P. 3.170(f); (2) revocation allowed if "fair and
just": Delaware Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32(d); Hawaii R. Penal P. 32(d); (3) revocation allowed
if "fair and just" unless substantial state prejudice: Indiana Code Ann. § 35-35-1-4(b) (West
1997); (4) revocation allowed in the "interests of justice": Maryland R. Cr. 4-242(f); (5)
revocation allowed to remedy "manifest injustice": Alaska R. Crim. P. 14.4(e); Minnesota 49
Minn. Stat. Ann. R. Crim. P. 15.05(1) (West 1979). In Connecticut, guilty plea withdrawal is
permitted as of right prior to the plea's "acceptance" by the court, Connecticut R. Super. Ct.
Cr. § 720, but after acceptance, the plea may only be revoked if the accused can demonstrate
that it was involuntary or uninformed, § 721. Under Georgia's Official Code, O.C.G.A. § 17-
7-93(b), an accused has an unqualified and unlimited right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to
sentencing, which may be exercised regardless of whether the withdrawal is motivated by
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An appropriate starting point for consideration of the American
federal experience with guilty plea revocation is the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Kercheval v. United States.7" There, the
accused had been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, and the question
before the Court was whether the plea could be used against him at trial.
This was the very same issue raised in Thibodeau, and like Canada's
Supreme Court, the American Court concluded that the evidence of the
revoked plea is inadmissible. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made
the following statement about guilty plea revocation:
Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful
that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after
proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences. When one
so pleads he may be held bound.... But on timely application, the court
will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given
through ignorance, fear or inadvertence. Such an application does not
involve any question of guilt or innocence. The court in exercise of its
discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and
have a trial if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and
just.
79
The revocation rule applied by federal courts has been codified in r.
32(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which creates a
distinction between pre-sentencing and post-sentencing revocation:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be made only
before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to
correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.8"
This rule has been interpreted as imposing a lighter burden on the
defendant when seeking to vacate a guilty plea prior to, as opposed to
after, sentencing.8' Leaving aside, for the moment, the distinction be-
tween pre- and post-sentencing, it is notable that the rule provides little
guidance for determining the permissibility of revocation. Hence, in the
pre-sentencing context, the rule has been interpreted as incorporating the
"fair and just" standard from Kercheval.8z This standard, like the "valid
tactical reasons, or would prejudice the prosecution: Thompson v. The State, 462 S.E.2d 404
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995); see also: Weathers v. The State, 255 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. S.C. 1979); Chives
v. The State, 449 S.E. 2d 152 (Ga. C.A. 1994). After sentencing, revocation lies within the
discretion of the trial judge.
78. 47 S.Ct. 582 (1927).
79. Ibid. at 583.
80. United States, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1994), r. 32(e).
81. Gartner, supra note 11 at 793; H.J. Alperin, Annotation, "Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty
or Nolo Contendere, After Sentence, Under Rule 32(d) of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure" (1971) 9 A.L.R. Fed. 309 at 316-17.
82. Ibid.
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grounds" concept from Bamsey and Adgey, is rather open-ended. In fact,
at least one American court has complained that the standard applicable
to a pre-sentencing motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, "is not easily
defined."83 However, one aspect of the rule which is well-established is
that, as in Canada, the decision to allow or refuse revocation rests within
the discretion of the judge hearing the application, and can only be
overturned on appeal if it can be shown that the judge abused his or her
discretion. As a standard of review, abuse of discretion is very lax.' Its
Canadian equivalent would be "patent unreasonableness".
Whereas the open-ended, discretionary nature of the Canadian revo-
cation rule has led to some incoherence and inconsistency, it is possible
to discern two lines of case law flowing from the similarly general
American federal rule. This bifurcation of the authorities was identified
by Paul E. Gartner, who observed that some courts have emphasized the
discretionary nature of the revocation rule, and the fact that revocation is
a privilege as opposed to an absolute right, in adopting a strict test for
revocation. Other courts have adopted a "more lenient rule" based on the
principle that pre-sentencing revocation should be "freely allowed.
'8 5
Gartner added, however, that the trend in the United States as of 1975 was
toward a stricter approach to revocation. He attributed this to the exist-
ence of r. 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which imposes
a mandatory duty on a trial judge to explain the nature and sentencing
ramifications of the charge(s) to the accused prior to pleading86 and to
inform the accused that a guilty plea results in the waiving of the right to
trial,87 and further requires the trial judge to ensure after pleading, by
addressing the accused personally, "that the plea is voluntary and not the
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.""8
If the requirements of r. 11 have been met then, according to Gartner,
83. Bruce v. U.S., 379 F.2d 113 at 121 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
84. An abuse of discretion exists only if the tribunal, "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage ofjustice", People
v. Jordan, 721 P.2d 79 at 82 (S.C. Cal. 1986). See also J.C. Kelso, "A Report on the California
Appellate System" (1994) 45 Hastings L.J. 433 at 474.
85. Gartner, supra note 11 at 794-95. Gartner identifies cases such as Pool v. United States,
250 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1957) and Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963) as
examples of a more lenient approach. In contrast, cases such as UnitedStates v. Swaggerty, 218
F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1955) and Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
[hereinafter Everett] represent a stricter approach. See also H.J. Alperin, Annotation, "With-
drawal of Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere, Before Sentence, Under Rule 32(d) of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure" (1971) 6 A.L.R. Fed. 665 at 670 & 675-77 and Supplement
(October 1995). He also identifies two lines of cases based on the "no absolute right" and
"freely allowed" principles.
86. United States, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, r. I l(c)(l).
87. United States, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, r. II (c)(4).
88. United States, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, r. I I(d).
180 The Dalhousie Law Journal
[t]he Courts seem to indicate that since they are bending over backwards
to make sure that a defendant is aware of what he is doing when he enters
a guilty plea, they will not allow that defendant to make a mockery of the
system by allowing him to withdraw his plea simply because he changes
his mind and now wants a jury trial.89
The United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of pre-sentencing
guilty plea revocation in 1972 in Dukes v. Warden, Connecticut State
Prison.9° In this case, Dukes pleaded guilty to charges of narcotics
possession and larceny of goods on the basis of a plea bargain, and on the
advice of his lawyer. Prior to the guilty plea, however, Dukes had
repeatedly expressed his misgivings. A month after entering the plea, and
prior to sentencing, Dukes applied to withdraw his plea and proceed to
trial. The basis for the withdrawal was that his lawyer was in a position
of conflict of interest, he had received inadequate counsel as a result, and
his guilty plea (which was entered on his lawyer's advice) was therefore
involuntary and uninformed. 91
The trial judge, in rejecting Dukes' revocation motion, stated that
nothing in the record indicated that the alleged conflict resulted in
ineffective counsel or made Dukes' plea involuntary or unintelligent. On
appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court preferred to defer to the trial
judge's exercise of discretion. This view also prevailed in the United
States Supreme Court.92 However, in a strong dissent, Justice Marshall 93
sought to re-cast the revocation rule. In reliance on an earlier decision
concerning plea revocation following the prosecution's repudiation of a
89. Supra note II at 799. Note, however, that compliance with r. 11 is not necessarily a bar
to a motion under r. 32(d) to withdraw a guilty plea. In United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999
at 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Roberts], the Court made this point in holding that "[t]he
defendant's personal responses to Rule 11 inquiries are understandably likely to be inaccurate
and somewhat confused" and that "[diefendants' responses to judicial questioning at the Rule
II hearing are notoriously unreliable".
90. Supra note **
91. Dukes' lawyer also represented two girls who were involved in the larceny charges, had
pleaded guilty, and were sentenced before the same judge who was to sentence Dukes a few
weeks later. During the girls' sentencing hearing, the lawyer requested leniency for them,
telling the Court that they had come "under the influence of Dukes", but should be credited for
agreeing "to testify against him that capitulated him into taking a plea on which he will shortly
be removed from society...", ibid. at 256. This formed the basis of Dukes' conflict of interest
claim. He further claimed that his plea was tainted because he had just been released from
hospital and did not appreciate the nature of the charges or the ramifications of pleading guilty.
92. Brennan J., in brief reasons, agreed with the lower courts that there was no merit to Dukes'
claim that the alleged conflict of interest affected his plea.
93. Marshall J. was joined by Douglas J. Stewart J. agreed with Marshall J. on the law, but
decided that the case was actually one of post-sentencing revocation, and thereby reached a
different result, supra note ** at 258.
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plea bargain, Santobello v. New York, 9 4 he emphasized that there is a
constitutional right not to plead guilty, and that, "[a] defendant may waive
his constitutional rights through a guilty plea, but such waivers are not
quickly presumed, and, in fact, are viewed with the 'utmost solici-
tude'." 95 For this reason, he preferred to frame the revocation rule such
that a defendant is required to present "a reason for vacating his plea", and
withdrawal is only to be denied if the government has been prejudiced by
relying on the guilty plea.96 Thus, where the government is able to show
"specific and substantial harm" due to its reliance on a guilty plea, then
the accused may be held to the earlier plea.97 However, Justice Marshall
thought that "ordinarily", the government can claim only disappointed
expectations. In such a case, the balance of interests must favour vindi-
cation of the individual's "most basic constitutional rights."98 He elabo-
rated on the justification for his liberal approach as follows:
I would not view a guilty plea as an irrevocable waiver of a defendant's
federal constitutional right to a full trial, even where the plea is, strictly
speaking, "voluntarily" entered....
.. We view guilty pleas with the "utmost solicitude" because they
involve the simultaneous waiver of so many constitutional rights; our
system of law favors the assertion of constitutional rights, not their waiver.
It is inconsistent with that basic viewpoint for guilty pleas to be irrevocable
even before sentencing. Usually, because of new information or new
insights, defendants may have "sober second thoughts" about their pleas.
Where the sentencing itself is postponed beyond the day of pleading, the
door should not be slammed shut to formal reconsideration of the decision
to plead guilty. A guilty plea is not a trap. Ordinarily, a defendant who
changes his mind for sufficient reason and in timely fashion should not be
deemed to have waived his right to a full trial. In short, absent the
government's showing specific and substantial harm, I would generally
permit withdrawal of the plea before sentencing.99
Thus, Justice Marshall placed the issue of guilty plea revocation squarely
within the realm of constitutional law.
One problem with Justice Marshall's test relates to the fact that he did
not elaborate in any detail on what could constitute a "sufficient" or
"good" 100 reason justifying revocation. On the facts in Dukes, however,
he pointed to the conflict of interest of Dukes' lawyer as sufficient to
94. 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971), per Marshall J. concurring in part and dissenting in part.
95. Dukes, supra note ** at 265.
96. Ibid. at 266.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid. at 265-66.
100. Ibid.at 270.
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support guilty plea revocation, because this conflict made it "plausible"
that the plea was unsound by reason of inadequate legal counsel. 10
"Plausibility" as the standard to judge an accused's ground for seeking
revocation is certainly a low threshold. Nevertheless, it may well be
consistent with the importance of the constitutional rights at stake, and the
need for a cautious approach to constitutional waiver. If indeed the
Constitution favours the assertion-as opposed to the waiver-of rights,
then a plausible reason should be sufficient to permit an accused to escape
from an earlier constitutional waiver.
Since Justice Marshall's position failed to command a majority in
Dukes, the American federal revocation rule remains discretionary, and
bifurcated between the "no absolute right" and the "freely allowed"
camps. Justice Marshall's opinion has had some influence insofar as it
emphasized a balancing between the accused's reasons for seeking
revocation, and the prejudice advanced by the prosecution in opposition.
Hence, the recent American case law has seen a focus on the issue of state
prejudice. 10 2 An example of this modem approach is United States v.
Roberts. °3 There, the accused moved to revoke his guilty plea because
the prosecution had failed to disclose to him a material element of the plea
agreement. The trial judge had denied the motion, but the Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, reversed. The Court held not only
that the inadequate disclosure was a sufficient reason to justify revoca-
tion, but also admonished the prosecution for opposing the revocation
motion when withdrawal of the accused's guilty plea would have entailed
no prejudice to the government's interests (other than the delay and
expense inherent to a trial).' °
It is interesting to observe that the issue of prejudice to the government
had been mentioned in the Canadian case of Nelson'05 in 1919, thus
101. Ibid. at 268-69. Justice Marshall concluded his reasons, at 271, by stating, "Where the
defendant has presented a plausible reason for withdrawing his plea, [the disappointed
expectations of the state] cannot bar him from regaining his constitutional rights before
sentencing."
102. See, for example, United States v. Savage, 561 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Acevedo-Ramos, 619 F. Supp. 570 (Dist. Ct. Puerto Rico 1985), aff'd 810 F.2d 308 (1 st Cir.
1987) [hereinafterAcevedo-Ramos]; United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1976);
United States v. Carden, 599 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1979). In fact, H.J. Alperin's 1971 annotation
in the A.L.R. Fed., supra note 85, does not mention "prejudice" to government as a factor to
be considered in assessing a revocation motion, whereas the 1985 Supplement does so, supra
note 85 at 186-87.
103. Roberts, supra note 89.
104. lbid. at 1011-13.
105. Supra note 33.
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predating Justice Marshall's decision in Dukes by some 53 years. How-
ever, while prejudice has increasingly become the focus of the American
jurisprudence, it is rarely mentioned in the recent Canadian decisions. In
fact, neither the trial judges nor the appellate courts in Lamoureux and Leo
considered the question of government prejudice.
IV. Developing a Revocation Rule Consistent with Charter Values
Canada's guilty plea revocation rule should be reconsidered in order to
frame it in a manner consistent with modem Charter values. As will be
argued below, a constitutional update is overdue.
As the analysis above has demonstrated, the current revocation rule
requires an accused to assert a "valid ground" for revocation. This test
raises two distinct legal problems and several subsidiary questions. First,
what kinds of grounds may justify revocation? Is it sufficient for the
accused to assert a sincere change of heart based on "sober second
thought"? May the accused succeed by demonstrating a change of
circumstances since the plea? Or, must the accused advance some
rationale for concluding that the guilty plea was, at the time of its making,
involuntary or misinformed? Secondly, what is the standard of proof
which must be met by an accused on a revocation motion? Does the
accused have to substantiate, on a balance of probabilities, the ground
asserted for revocation? Or, must there merely be an air of reality to the
ground? It is remarkable that, on an issue as important as guilty plea
revocation, these basic issues remain unresolved in Canadian law.
Certainly, one can imagine both liberal and restrictive revocation tests.
For example, the most narrow of revocation rules might be framed as
follows: on a revocation application, an accused must prove, on a balance
of probabilities, that the plea was either made involuntarily or without
sufficient awareness at the time of its making. In fact, this would seem to
be the approach applied by the trial judges in both Lamoureux and Leo.
An issue distinct from the revocation test to be applied by trial judges
is the standard of review to be adopted in appeals. The present Canadian
rule places the revocation decision within the discretion of the judge
hearing the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, with the result that a
standard of review similar to "patent unreasonableness" is applied by
appellate courts. Should the highly discretionary nature of the revocation
rule survive in the Charter era?
Reference to the Charter values implicated by guilty plea revocation,
and the principles flowing from these values, will assist in resolving the
issues of "valid grounds", standard of proof and the rules for appellate
review.
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A. The Charter Values at Stake
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms places a premium on
legal rights such as the right to silence and the right to put the Crown's
case to the test of a trial. Prior to the entrenchment of the Charter, a guilty
plea was characterized as a serious waiver of legal rights;"° after 1982,
a guilty plea must be recognized as a significant waiver of constitutional
rights. As such, it must be approached with caution and scepticism. °7
This is because, to paraphrase Justice Marshall in Dukes, Canada's legal
and constitutional order is premised on the value to individuals, and to
society generally, of the assertion of constitutional rights, as opposed to
their waiver.
The overriding values embodied by the Charter, and which should be
advanced by an updated revocation rule, are the promotion of fairness
within, and the preservation of the integrity of, the criminal justice
system. In the case of guilty plea revocation, the primary rationale of
which is to ensure that the criminal justice system does not punish those
who are legally not guilty and morally blameless (see Part II above), these
values would be best served by a liberal rule, in order to ensure that
accuseds who sincerely wish to assert their constitutional rights are
permitted to do so. However, in some circumstances, fairness andjustice
system integrity would dictate denial of a revocation motion. This would
include cases where the initial guilty plea was a strategic ploy, or where
it has substantially prejudiced the Crown's ability to prosecute the case
to trial. Such circumstances will be elaborated below.
It is argued that the following general principles flow from the relevant
Charter values:
(1) The guilty plea revocation rule should favour the vindication and
assertion of constitutional rights, to the extent that this promotes
fairness and preserves the integrity of the justice system;
106. Adgey, supra note 5 at 440 (per Laskin J.).
107. Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on the issue of criminal law waiver has
emphasized that the validity of a waiver depends on it "being clear and unequivocal that the
person is waiving the procedural safeguard and is doing so with full knowledge of the rights
the procedure was enacted to protect and of the effect the waiver will have on those rights in
the process", Korponay, supra note 4 at 49. See also: R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 at
394-95, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 493; R. v. Prosper, [19941 3 S.C.R. 236 at 274-75, 118 D.L.R. (4th)
154 [hereinafter Prosper cited to S.C.R.] (concerning waiver of the s. 10(b) right to counsel);
R. v.Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 at 1228-29,74 D.L.R. (4th) 355; R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R.
771 at 790-91, 71 C.C.C. (3d) I (concerning waiver of the s. 11 (b) right to a trial within a
reasonable time). The Court has clearly adopted a cautious approach to constitutional waiver.
For example, "the standard required for an effective waiver of the right to counsel is very high",
Prosper, ibid. at 275.
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(2) Following from (1), the rule should provide for revocation in two
separate contexts: (i) where an accused's waiver of constitutional
rights through a guilty plea was not legitimate at the time of its
making, because it was involuntary or uninformed (i.e. invalid con-
stitutional waiver), and (ii) where the accused wishes to revoke her
guilty plea and re-assert her constitutional rights without questioning
the validity of the plea (i.e. reassertion of constitutional rights);
(3) Following from (1) and (2), the issues addressed by the revocation
rule should be limited to the validity of a constitutional waiver, and the
permissibility of re-asserting constitutional rights despite a valid
waiver. The accused's moral guilt, and the likelihood of the accused
being found legally guilty, should be irrelevant to guilty plea revoca-
tion.
B. Proposals for an Updated Revocation Rule
In light of the values and principles outlined above, it is proposed to
frame the revocation rule in two separate parts, the first dealing with the
situation where constitutional waiver through a guilty plea is attacked as
being invalid, and the second concerning the re-assertion of constitu-
tional rights despite a legitimate waiver. Each part will be stated and then
a commentary will be provided:
1. Invalid Constitutional Waiver
Where the accused demonstrates, on a balance ofprobabilities, that his or
her guilty plea was not valid, in the sense that it was involuntary or
uninformed, then a not guilty plea will be substituted for the guilty plea.
This aspect of the proposed rule resembles the rule which, it would
seem, is presently applied by some Canadian courts. It requires the
accused to assert a ground justifying revocation, and to prove the validity
of that ground on a balance of probabilities. In other words, the accused
must satisfy the judge hearing the revocation motion that the plea would
probably have been different in light of the ground asserted. Although
Canadian case law is helpful, there is also considerable jurisprudence
from the American courts which provides guidance as to the grounds
which are relevant to the validity of a constitutional waiver through a
guilty plea. These can be divided roughly into three categories. First,
there may have been circumstances at the time of pleading which
prevented the accused from fully appreciating the ramifications of a
guilty plea, such as incompetent or inadequate counsel,'018 or the accused's
108. R. v. Fraser, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 248, 5 C.C.C. (2d) 439 (B.C.C.A.) (unrepresented
accuseds pleaded guilty, but later statements indicated that they could have mounted a
defence); R. v. Lavoie (1986), 73 A.R. 72 (C.A.) [hereinafter Lavoie] (guilty plea revoked
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own mental or other infirmities.'°9 Such factors go to the requirement that
a valid guilty plea must be informed. Second, information may come to
light subsequent to the guilty plea which, if it had been known by the
accused at the time of the plea, would have made the guilty plea
unlikely." ° Again, this would be relevant to the informed nature of the
plea. For example, the revelation that a key prosecution witness had lied
could justify guilty plea revocation, since the accused may not have
entered a guilty plea if she had known of the perjury."' Third, the
accused's plea may have been induced by pressure, threats, or induce-
ments. Threats from third parties," 2 pressure from legal counsel," 3 or
promises of a reduced sentence from the trial judge' 14 or Crown" 5 could
bring into question the voluntariness of a guilty plea.
because it was entered in the absence of counsel, and the accused was only 18 years old); United
States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (counsel's failure to apprise the accused
of a key decision of the United States Supreme Court, which rendered the counts against the
accused invalid, justified withdrawal of guilty plea).
109. United States v. Joslin, 434 F.2d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (accused's history of mental
problems, including masochistic tendencies, brought the validity of his guilty plea into
question); R. v. Huynh (1986), 75 A.R. 238 (C.A.) (accused's linguistic difficulties, and
inaccurate interpretation, justified revocation).
110. United States v. Morgan, 567 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (a psychiatric report, filed after
the accused pleaded guilty, supported his insanity defence, so his plea was vacated). See also
People v. Harvey, 198 Cal. Rptr. 58 (5th Dist. 1984); R. v. Catcheway, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 744,
8 Man. R. (2d) 122 (Man. Cty. Ct.) [hereinafter Catcheway cited to W.W.R.] (accused entered
guilty plea on the advice of counsel, but the plea was allowed to be withdrawn after it became
known that counsel had been misinformed as to material facts by the Crown).
111. United States v. Schubert, 728 F.2d 1364 (1 th Cir. 1984) (the accused pleaded guilty,
but then learned that a witness had lied in denying a role as a government informant; the fact
that the witness was an informant provided the basis for an entrapment defence, so the
accused's plea was revoked).
112. United States v. Cammisano, 599 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1979) (family coercion coupled with
pressure from the trial judge led to the conclusion that guilty plea unsafe).
113. Lamoureux, supra note 56; United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1974) (guilty
plea vacated because lawyer may have pressured accused to plead guilty in order to secure a
favourable plea bargain for co-accuseds).
114. Exparte Otinger, 493 So.2d 1362 (Ala. 1986) (the accused was permitted to withdraw
his guilty plea, which was induced by the trial judge's indication of a lighter sentence, after it
became apparent that the sentence was unavailable in the circumstances); State v. Reid, 526
A.2d 528 (Conn. 1987) (the accused should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea,
since the trial judge told him that he would be entitled to do so if the judge refused to accept
the terms of a plea bargain).
115. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1972) (where the accused was induced to
plead guilty on the basis of a plea bargain, but the trial judge was unable to accept the sentencing
promises made by the prosecution, then the accused was permitted to withdraw his plea). There
is a considerable body of American jurisprudence concerning guilty plea revocation where the
prosecution's promises are not fulfilled. See Annotation, "Right to withdraw guilty pleas in
state criminal proceedings where court refuses to grant concessions contemplated by plea
bargain" (1975) 66 A.L.R. 3d 902, and Supplement (August 1996).
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In attacking the asserted ground, the Crown may take issue with the
accused's sincerity, perhaps by alleging that the accused is engaging in
mischiefordelay.11 The Crown may also attack the alleged ground itself.
For example, if the accused claims to have misunderstood the ramifica-
tions of a guilty plea, the Crown might lead evidence of the accused's
prior experience with the justice system to show a level of sophistication
inconsistent with the accused's claim. Moreover, if, at the time of the
guilty plea, the trial judge inquired of the accused to be satisfied that the
plea was voluntary and aware, then this might also be relevant to the
determination of whether the accused has met the burden of proof."'
It is surely irrelevant, however, to the validity of a constitutional
waiver through a guilty plea that the accused may be considered to be
morally guilty, has failed to assert his or her innocence to the charges, 
1 1 8
or is likely to be found guilty at trial. At the pleading stage, the law is
unconcerned with such matters; hence, there is no requirement that an
accused assert moral innocence as a pre-condition to a plea of not guilty.
Nor should the law be concerned with such matters in the context of
revocation. The issue is whether the plea was valid (i.e. voluntary and
informed), and not whether the plea reflects the moral, or ultimate legal,
status of the accused. This point is particularly important where the
accused asserts, as a ground for vacating a guilty plea, that there exists a
defence of which he was not aware at the time of pleading (perhaps
because of incompetent counsel, or because of new information). It
would be inappropriate for a court to determine the validity of the defence
as part of the revocation motion. 19 Whether or not the defence is likely
to succeed at trial is a separate question from the issue to be considered
116. See for example, United States v. Trott, 604 F. Supp. 1045 at 1049-50 (Dist. Ct. 1985),
aff'd 779 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1986), where the accused sought to negotiate an agreement for
favourable treatment, following his guilty plea, but failed: "These facts and circumstances cast
considerable doubt on the sincerity of the defendant's claim that he is innocent."
117. In the American jurisprudence, the fact that a trial judge has fulfilled the compulsory
requirements of r. 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been significant to
revocation decisions, supra note 89. Canada has no such compulsory inquiry requirement,
supra note 12, but where an inquiry has occurred, the accused's answers may be significant to
the question of whether the guilty plea was voluntary and informed.
118. Some American cases have held that a failure by an accused to make a positive assertion
of innocence is a bar to guilty plea revocation, Everett, supra note 85; United States v. Stayton,
285 F. Supp. 428 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1968). Interestingly, the American Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure, r. 444(e), would permit a defendant to move for withdrawal of his guilty plea
without alleging that he is innocent of the charge to which the plea was entered. Indeed, the
question of the accused's guilt or innocence should be kept separate from the issue of the
voluntariness and intelligibility of a guilty plea.
119. As seems to have occurred in Dickson J.'s reasons inAdgey, supra note 5.
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in a revocation motion, which is whether the accused would have entered
a guilty plea if fully apprised of the defence at the time of pleading.
2 0
Moreover, it should be irrelevant to the question of whether a guilty
plea was valid that the Crown could (or even would) suffer prejudice from
the withdrawal of the plea. If a judge concludes, on a balance of
probabilities, that in the absence of the asserted ground the accused would
not have entered a guilty plea, then the plea is not valid and the accused
must be allowed to plead not guilty. It would be contrary to the values
enshrined in the Charter to hold an accused to an invalid guilty plea
because of Crown prejudice since this would result in the punishing of an
accused whose legal guilt has never been determined. For this same
reason, it would be inappropriate to deny revocation in reliance on the
value of finality in the criminal justice system. Of course, the Crown
should be at liberty to lead evidence that the accused's guilty plea
revocation efforts are insincere or are part of a strategy to undermine the
Crown's prosecution efforts (i.e. mischief). Potential or actual prejudice
by itself should be irrelevant.
2. Re-assertion of Constitutional Rights
Where the accused asserts a sincere change of heart, and the Crown is
unable to advance a valid justification for holding the accused to his plea,
then a not guilty plea will be substituted for the guilty plea.
This second aspect of the proposed revocation rule would be new to
Canadian law, as it would permit accuseds to revoke their constitutional
waiver of rights through a guilty plea without having to prove the
invalidity of the plea. Thus, where an accused sincerely desires to re-
assert the right to a trial, he or she should be allowed to do so except in
the case where there is a "valid justification" for holding the accused to
the guilty plea. This follows from the scepticism and caution to be applied
to a constitutional waiver, and the value placed in our legal system on the
assertion of constitutional rights. It is notable that the Supreme Court of
Canada has yet to consider a case where an accused has sought to
withdraw a constitutional waiver and to re-assert the right in question. To
120. After all, the pleading decision involves the weighing of risks, supra notes 17 & 19.
Thus, even if a defence seems far-fetched, the decision to plead guilty may involve the
weighing of a variety of factors, such as the merits of other possible defences and possible
sentences. An accused could convincingly state that, in light of the factors he or she was
considering at the time of pleading, there was a reason to plead notguilty in the hopes of a lighter
sentence. However, if the accused had known of another possible defence, the risk of a heavier
sentence would have been outweighed by the chance of acquittal, and a not guilty plea would
have been more logical.
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date, the Court's jurisprudence is limited to the requirements for a valid
waiver under ss. 10(b) and 11(b) of the Charter.2 Arguably, the
uniquely damaging effects of a constitutional waiver through a guilty plea
would justify a special rule allowing the waiver to be revoked. However,
it could be argued that any waiver of a constitutional legal right is so
significant that if it is possible to permit the accused to re-assert the
waived right without substantial prejudice to the Crown, then the waiver
should generally be nullified.
This new aspect of the revocation rule would run counter to the pre-
Charter common law position that a plea should be binding unless the
accused is able to advance (and prove) a valid reason for its withdrawal.
However, surely Charter values now support the adoption of the opposite
position. Hence, the constitutional waiver of rights through a guilty plea
has such severe ramifications that it should not be binding unless there is
some good reason for holding an accused to the plea (even if the validity
of the plea is not disputed by the accused). There are, it is submitted, two
valid justifications for denying revocation on the basis of a sincere change
of heart: (1) revocation would result in significant prejudice to the Crown;
and (2) sentencing has already occurred. Each will be discussed in turn.
1. Crown prejudice as a bar to revocation - As with Part (a) of the
proposed revocation rule described above, the Crown could counter a
revocation motion by demonstrating that the accused's revocation efforts
are insincere, for example, to cause delay or to wear down witnesses.
However, under this second aspect of the revocation rule, the Crown
would generally be required to show significant prejudice resulting from
the accused's original guilty plea, which would make it unjust to grant the
revocation. This is effectively the position adopted by Justice Marshall in
Dukes, when he argued that a revocation motion based on "sober second
thought" and made "in a timely fashion" should only be denied where the
prosecution can show "specific and substantial harm." 22 Interestingly,
the adoption of this new aspect of the revocation rule into the Canadian
common law would reinstate the prevailing approach from the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, which treated revocation much more
liberally. 23 It would also give effect to Walsh J.A.'s preferred position,
asserted in 1919, that revocation should be permitted "in any case in
which the application was made in proper time and no prejudice resulted
to the Crown from the original plea ... ,"24 How ironic that these courts
121. Adgey, supra note 5.
122. Supra note **.
123. Supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
124. Nelson, supra note 33.
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were more sensitive to the values subsequently embodied in the Charter
than their counterparts in the post-Charter era.
What, then, would constitute prejudice sufficient to deny a sincere
revocation motion? As Justice Marshall stated, a timely application to
revoke a guilty plea will only rarely be defeated by a finding of substantial
prejudice to the government. 25 Hence, as the delay between the plea and
the revocation motion increases, so too does the likelihood of the state
meeting its burden of showing significant prejudice. Overtime, witnesses
may leave the jurisdiction, memories may fade or evidence may become
stale. American case law on the issue of prejudice is now sufficiently
advanced that it can provide important guidance to Canadian courts.
126
2. Sentencing as a bar to revocation - Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure draws a sharp distinction between pre- and post-
sentencing guilty plea revocation. Thus, post-sentencing revocation is
only allowed "to correct manifest injustice", whereas according to the
Kercheval test incorporated into r. 32(d), pre-sentencing revocation is
permissible if it is "fair and just.' 27 The early English case law seems to
have closed the door to post-sentencing revocation, 28 but the pre-/post-
sentencing distinction has not played a prominent role in Canadian
jurisprudence. Certainly, there is no hard and fast rule barring revocation
after sentencing, nor is there any judicial pronouncement similar to r.
32(d) that post-sentencing revocation applications should be approached
with particular scepticism. 29 In fact, many Canadian courts have consid-
ered post-sentencing revocation applications without mentioning as a
consideration the fact that sentencing had already taken place. 130 This is
125. Dukes, supra note **.
126. Supra note 102. Some examples of prejudice which has defeated a revocation motion
include: United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (in a case where the revocation
motion was brought eight months after the guilty plea was entered, and co-accuseds had already
been tried and convicted, the Court held that the prosecution would be prejudiced if the guilty
plea were vacated because of the difficulties of re-assembling witnesses, and because the
publicity from the co-accuseds' trial would make jury selection at a new trial difficult); United
States v. Tammaro, 93 F.R.D. 826 (Ga. N.D. 1982) (the accused's revocation motion was
defeated because the government had placed important witnesses under the witness protection
program, and bringing them back for a new trial might jeopardize their new identities);
Acevedo-Ramos, supra note 102 (after the accused's guilty plea, the government dismantled
its case, witnesses were sent back to jail, and other witnesses had disappeared; therefore, the
prejudice to the government of allowing a new trial outweighed the grounds advanced by the
accused for revoking his guilty plea).
127. Supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
128. Supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
129. In Thibodeau, supra note 37 at 653 the Court considered revocation "any time before
sentencing" but did not discuss revocation after sentencing.
130. See Hansen, supra note 55; Catcheway, supra note 110; R. v. Melanson (1983), 59
N.S.R. (2d) 54 (C.A.); Lavoie, supra note 108; R. v. Hughes (1987), 76 A.R. 294 (C.A.).
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not surprising, given that sentencing may occur immediately after plead-
ing, or may be delayed days or weeks. Where an accused is able to assert
and substantiate a ground which brings into question the validity of the
guilty plea itself, the moment of sentencing would be a somewhat
arbitrary cut-off point for determining whether or not a motion for
revocation should be entertained. Nevertheless, the issue of sentencing
has some force in the context of Part (b) of the updated revocation rule,
and it is therefore necessary to consider the rationales advanced for
imposing a higher test on accuseds seeking revocation after sentencing.
The first rationale supporting a separate, higher test for post-sentenc-
ing revocation is the discouragement of "sentence-testing","3' a strategy
used by accuseds to gauge the sentence which they might expect to
receive following a trial verdict of guilty. Given the difficulties of
predicting sentences and the sentencing benefits of an early guilty plea,
an accused might plead guilty to determine the extent of his or her
"sentencing risk". If the sentence following a guilty plea is harsher than
expected, then an accused might decide that the sentencing risk of an
unsuccessful trial is not so great, and might therefore seek a revocation
of the guilty plea. By making post-sentencing revocation more difficult,
the American revocation rule discourages such strategic pleading, and
limits the resulting delays and costs associated with it.
It is difficult to imagine that sufficient numbers of accuseds would
deliberately engage in the strategy of sentence-testing to justify a higher
test for post-sentencing revocation. However, a higher test would also
address those accuseds who seek revocation out of disappointment at the
ultimate sentence received. In some cases, for example, accuseds will
expect lighter sentences based on assurances from counsel, or represen-
tations from prosecutors. A more severe sentence might come as a
surprise, thus prompting second thoughts about the guilty plea. There is
strong support in Canadian law for the view that mere sentencing
disappointment is not a valid ground on which to base a revocation
motion. In R. v. Lyons,' the Supreme Court of Canada considered the
case of a sixteen-year-old accused who pleaded guilty to several charges
involving violence and the use of firearms. A sentencing hearing was
scheduled, but prior to the hearing, the Crown applied to have the accused
declared a "dangerous offender" pursuant to Part XXIV of the Criminal
Code.'33 Such an application, if successful, would have subjected the
131. Alperin, supra note 81 at 670.
132. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Lyons cited to S.C.R.].
133. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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accused to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. The hearing
proceeded and the Crown succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused qualified as a "dangerous offender". The accused
appealed, one of his grounds being that the failure of the Crown to notify
him prior to his guilty plea of its intention to make a dangerous offender
application infringed his rights under s. 7 of the Charter, and rendered his
guilty plea invalid.
La Forest J., for the majority, gave the s. 7 argument short shrift,
commenting that,
[s]ubsequent dissatisfaction with the "way things turned out" or with the
sentence received is not, in my view, a sufficient reason to move this Court
to inquire into the reasons behind the election or plea of an offender,
particularly where there is nothing to suggest that these were anything
other than informed and voluntary acts.' 34
Wilson J., in dissent, took the view that the principles of fundamental
justice guaranteed by s. 7 dictate that, "an accused know the full extent
of his jeopardy before he pleads guilty to a criminal offence for which a
term of imprisonment may be imposed." '135 For Wilson J., the issue was
whether the accused's guilty plea was sufficiently informed on the issue
of sentencing. She concluded that it was not because, if the accused had
been aware at the time of pleading of the Crown's intention to apply for
a dangerous offender designation, he probably would not have pleaded
guilty.
136
Although the Court has closed the door to guilty plea revocation on the
basis of mere sentencing dissatisfaction, it appears that where an accused
is under a misapprehension concerning the severity of penalty, revocation
may be permissible. In Lyons, La Forest J. concluded that the accused
should have been aware of the risks of a dangerous offender applica-
tion, 137 whereas Wilson J. cited the accused' s youth and the rarity of such
applications, to support her view that he did not appreciate the risk of an
indeterminate period of incarceration at the time of pleading, and that his
plea was therefore uninformed. Thus, if the Crown promised the accused
134. Lyons, supra note 132 at 372. La Forest J. cited the decision of the Quebec Court of
Appeal in Antoine v. R. (1984), 40 C.R. (3d) 375 for support.
135. Lyons, ibid. at 379-80.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid. at 370-71. La Forest J.'s reasons could be criticized for imposing an objective,
reasonableness standard in determining the informed nature of a plea. The issue, in the criminal
context, surely must be whether the accused himself was aware of the ramifications of his plea
(i.e. a subjective test). The Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 45 at 85, has dealt
with this exact issue. The Commission thought that withdrawal of a guilty plea should be
allowed where the accused had no prior notice of the prosecutor's intention to make a
dangerous offender application.
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that, in exchange for a guilty plea, it would not bring a dangerous offender
application, then the guilty plea would be unsafe if the Crown went back
on the promise. A rule allowing revocation where the accused proves on
a balance of probabilities that he did not appreciate, or misapprehended,
the sentencing ramifications at the time of pleading (i.e. Part (a) of the
updated revocation rule, "Invalid Constitutional Waiver", as described
above) is sensible in light of the influence played by sentencing expecta-
tions in the decision to plead guilty.
However, Part (b) of the proposed revocation rule presents some
problems in the context of post-sentencing guilty plea revocation. If,
indeed, mere sentencing dissatisfaction can never be a ground justifying
guilty plea revocation, then a rule allowing revocation after sentencing
unless the Crown can show substantial prejudice would seem to invite the
very revocation motions based on sentencing disappointment that were
rejected by Lyons. Moreover, if Part (b) were to apply in the case of post-
sentencing revocation, then it could promote "sentence-testing". These
considerations argue against the availability of Part (b) of the proposed
rule in the case of post-sentencing motions.
In fact, limiting Part (b), but not Part (a), to the pre-sentencing context
isjustifiable. Where, as in Part (a), an accused is able to prove on a balance
of probabilities that his guilty plea was invalid, then his legal guilt was
established through an illegitimate waiver of constitutional rights. The
law only punishes those who are legally guilty; therefore any sentence
imposed on an accused who has not legitimately been found guilty is,
itself, illegitimate. An illegitimate sentence can hardly stand in the way
of vindicating an accused's basic legal rights. However, under Part (b),
an accused is not questioning the validity of a constitutional waiver, but
is asking for the waiver to be set aside because of a sincere change of heart.
This change of heart, where it occurs after sentencing has taken place,
cannot alter the fact that the accused was legitimately legally guilty at the
time of sentencing, and that the sentence imposed was legitimate too. For
an accused to request the overturning of a legitimate constitutional waiver
and a legitimate sentence based on that waiver is asking too much, and
jeopardizes the integrity of the criminal justice system. At this stage, the
value of finality in the criminal justice system can be invoked to deny the
possibility of revocation.
C. The Appellate Standard of Review
The highly deferential standard applied by both American and Canadian
appellate courts when reviewing revocation decisions is difficult to
reconcile with the sensitive constitutional nature of the rights waiver
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inherent to a guilty plea.'38 Typically, an appellate court will defer to
factual findings made at trial if the trial judge was in a better position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and to determine the weight to be
accorded to the evidence.'39 Legal issues, and issues of mixed fact and
law (for example, the determination of whether a particular set of facts
meets a particular legal standard) are generally reviewed on a higher
standard of correctness. 1
40
The decision whether or not to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea
involves a range of factual, legal, and mixed fact/law issues. Under the
traditional Canadian revocation rule, ajudge hearing a revocation motion
must decide two distinct questions: (1) does the evidence support the
existence of the "ground" asserted by the accused in seeking revocation?;
and (2) is the ground a "valid" basis justifying revocation? While the first
question may be purely factual in nature, the second has a clear legal and
policy component. The second is also a constitutional issue which could
be re-stated as whether the ground asserted renders the waiver of
constitutional rights through a guilty plea invalid. Thus, in Leo, there was
little to support the Court of Appeal's deferential standard of review on
the second question, since the validity of Leo's guilty plea raised both
legal and constitutional considerations.' 4'
Generally, a trial judge will have discretion to make decisions on
administrative and procedural matters, for example change of venue
applications and continuance motions. 142 A lower standard of appellate
review may be justifiable for efficiency reasons since it discourages
appeals by the parties on the many procedural decisions taken over the
course of a trial, and thereby reduces the costs and delays associated with
such appeals. However, the efficiency rationale should only have force
where the issue at stake raises few public policy concerns, and has little
138. Grundmeyer, supra note 77 at 833.
139. Where the evidence is contained in affidavits, or when there is no issue of credibility
arising from the testimony, then appellate courts may intervene in factual conclusions of the
trial judge, reasoning that they are in as good a position as the trial judge to make factual
findings.
140. Mewett, supra note 3 at 206, observes that distinguishing between issues of law and
issue of mixed fact and law can be difficult.
141. In R. v. Dunnett (1990), 111 N.B.R. (2d) 67 at 80-81,62 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (C.A.), Hoyt J.A.
canvassed the law on the issue of appeals implicating the interpretation of Charter rights. He
observed that it would be wrong to "restrict the ability of appellate courts to fulfil their role of
ensuring the proper interpretation of these fundamental rights-a direction that, by and large,
has been rejected. It is because these rights have been constitutionally enshrined that appellate
courts should be free to consider their application."
142. Kelso, supra note 84 at 475, observes that, "[a] trial judge's discretion is concentrated
in procedural and administrative matters", and, "little useful purpose would be served by
carefully scrutinizing the sort of decisions subject to the abuse of discretion standard."
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impact on the correctness of the ultimate judgment.'4 3 Guilty plea
revocation, as a constitutional waiver with grave consequences, raises
significant public policy concerns, and is directly linked to the ultimate
result of a criminal prosecution. Guilty plea revocation is thus qualita-
tively different from change of venue and other procedural issues. The
failure of appellate courts to recognize this and to apply a stricter standard
of appellate review is a deficiency which should be remedied under an
updated revocation rule."4
Because the rule proposed here will clarify the requirements for guilty
plea revocation, and will simplify it greatly in the case of pre-sentencing
revocation,'4 5 the nature and scope of the rule will necessarily be more
certain. This alone will lessen the dangers of leaving the revocation
decision within the discretion of thejudge hearing the revocation motion.
Nevertheless, the proposed rule calls for important determinations of a
legal nature. Under Part (a), there is a legal issue as to whether an asserted
ground is the sort which may render the accused's plea uninformed or
involuntary. Under Part (b), a key legal issue will be whether the
prejudice advanced by the Crown is sufficient to justify denying revoca-
tion. The existence of such legal issues and the constitutional nature of
guilty plea revocation generally, warrant the conclusion that revocation
decisions made at trial are not entitled to undue appellate deference.
Instead, they should be scrutinized carefully and sceptically.
Conclusion
The common law rule governing guilty plea revocation should be
reformed in order to recognize that a guilty plea is a serious waiver of
constitutional rights and that Charter values demand a rule which favours
the assertion, as opposed to the waiver, of such rights. To this end, this
article has proposed an updated revocation rule which, among other
suggestions, provides for the withdrawal of a guilty plea where the
accused can prove on a balance of probabilities that the guilty plea was
either uninformed or involuntary, and further allows for revocation at any
143. Ibid.
144. As a guilty plea is a waiver of constitutional rights, the revocation of the plea should be
approached on appeal in the same manner as other constitutional waivers. There is no indication
in the jurisprudence that a trial judge's finding concerning waiver of the s. 10(b) right to
counsel, or of the s. 1 (b) right to a trial within a reasonable time is entitled to appellate
deference.
145. The updated revocation rule would allow for pre-sentencing revocation as of right unless
the Crown is able to establish substantial prejudice. This approach was recommended in 1965
in "Presentence Withdrawal", supra note 76 at 764, in order to avoid the inconsistencies,
incoherence, and "unequal justice" of the American discretionary rule. See also ibid. at 769.
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time prior to sentencing unless the Crown can demonstrate significant
prejudice which would result from revocation.
The American jurisprudence on the issue of guilty plea revocation,
which has been considered in some detail in this article, has been more
sensitive to the constitutional issues at stake, and can provide guidance to
Canadian courts, particularly on the issue of Crown prejudice. However,
the failure of American appellate courts to adopt a strict standard of
review for revocation denials should not be replicated in Canada. Charter
values demand that appellate courts monitor carefully trial decisions
which have such a vital impact upon the constitutional rights of accuseds.
One result of the adoption of the revocation rule proposed herein will
no doubt be an increase in the number and in the success rate of guilty plea
revocation motions. The cost of these motions and of the resulting
criminal trials where the accused succeeds will probably impose a further
financial burden on the state. Yet before these costs are accepted as an
argument against reform, one should recall that the financial strains
within the justice system (i.e. lengthy delays, costly trials, inadequate
legal aid, a possible systemic bias in favour of plea bargaining over trials)
are in part responsible for the pleading pressures which can lead to
unsound guilty pleas. Hence, financial tension within the justice system
can be both an argument for, and against, relaxation of the rule governing
guilty plea withdrawal.
In a perfect world, the machinery ofjustice would advance efficiently
and rapidly, all accuseds would have access to the highest standards of
legal representation regardless of their personal financial means, and
defence and Crown counsel would have unlimited resources to pursue
their cases (yet would strive always to minimize delays). Suffice it to say
that we do not operate in this "legal nirvana" nor are we likely to in the
foreseeable future. Although the economics of the justice system is itself
a significant matter extending far beyond the issues raised in this article,
we can at least take note of the fact that the legal rights guaranteed by the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms transcend purely economic consider-
ations. Hence, although we might appreciate the savings in time and
money resulting from a judge's decision to deny a revocation motion
(particularly where the accused is apparently guilty), that same decision
may well offend our constitutional sensibilities where it is based on a pre-
Charter common law rule which lacks the coherence and sensitivity to
rights demanded by the modem constititutional order. Given the para-
mount importance of Charter rights and values, the interests ofjustice are
best served by the legal reform of the guilty plea revocation rule.
